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Abstract
Payments for environmental services (PES) schemes in developing countries face trade-o¤s
between environmental and development objectives. This tension is inherent in cost e¤ective
directPES since, by their very nature, they limit transfers to recipients. However, where re-
cipients of PES are subject to market constraints (e.g. credit rationing, input constraints etc.),
we show that indirect payments which relax constraints can be cost e¤ective and achieve both
environmental and poverty alleviation objectives. Contrary to where markets are perfect, cost ef-
fectiveness is dependent on the nature of the recipients production and the severity of constraints.
An empirical example from Madagascar illustrates that it is unlikely these dual objectives will
be achieved in the case of forest honey production, despite a severe technology constraint. Yet
indirect PES schemes are shown to be cost e¤ective where production is more closely linked to
land use, such as in agriculture and forestry. This accords with recent work on agri-environmental
schemes, which achieved poverty alleviation and environmental objectives by relaxing household
constraints. This highlights the need to understand the market conditions, institutional context
and production processes of PES recipients.
1 Introduction
Payments for environmental services (PES) have attracted increasing interest from both policy-makers
and researchers as a mechanism to translate external, non-market values of the environment into
nancial incentives for local actors to provide environmental services (Engel et al., 2008). Examples
include the pioneering, national-scale programme in Costa Rica (Pagiola, 2008), agri-environmental
schemes in Europe (e.g. Dobbs and Pretty, 2008) and biodiversity performance payments in Sweden
(Zabel and Holm-Muller, 2008). Due to evidence of negative impacts on local people from conservation
programmes in the past many PES schemes in developing countries have been implemented in order
not only to meet environmental policy objectives but also social or development-related objectives
(Pagiola et al., 2005). Gaining the support of local, resource-dependent people via improvements to
livelihoods and poverty alleviation may in turn assist in reaching conservation objectives.
Bulte et al. (2008) examine both conceptual and empirical evidence that PES in developing coun-
tries can both alleviate poverty and lead to more e¢ cient environmental outcomes. In conclusion they
suggest that the ability to reach twin goals, and hence induce win-winoutcomes, depends on context-
specic circumstances and programme design. Tying PES and poverty alleviation may, however, result
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in lower e¢ ciency in meeting either objective - and in fact it may be better to focus programmes on
one or the other objective separately. Moreover, a failure to reach stated twin objectives may increase
the likelihood of conict between conservation donors and local people, or non-compliance (Wunder,
2005).
In this paper, we investigate the importance of market and institutional conditions faced by re-
cipients of PES in determining the nature of cost-e¤ective PES schemes, and when such schemes can
achieve both environmental and poverty alleviation goals. Our framework for this analysis begins with
a broad denition of PES. We distinguish between directand indirectPES.1 Indirect PES provide
incentives to local people or recipients via some associated input to joint production of private and
public goods, e.g. subsidies for capital inputs to eco-tourism, forest honey production or even to en-
courage agricultural set-asides. Direct PES, on the other hand, are o¤ered directly and conditionally
to recipients in exchange for land-use changes such as forest conservation.
Choice of PES intervention has been investigated under the assumption that input and output
markets operate perfectly, and where market power exists (e.g. Ferraro and Simpson, 2002; 2005;
Ferraro et al., 2005). These analyses highlight the obvious tension in a developing country context
between the cost-e¤ectiveness of environmental objectives on the one hand, and poverty alleviation on
the other. That is, when markets are perfect and side payments are not possible, an NGO or donor
always prefers cost-e¤ective direct payments while the recipient prefers the indirect approach since
she prots from the additional payments required. In short, for a given budget the cost e¤ectiveness
of one policy objective is obtained at the expense of cost e¤ectiveness in the other.
The comparison of di¤erent approaches has been pitched as being between conditional payments
for the direct delivery of some kind of environmental outcome (direct) and an investment in , for
example, an Integrated Conservation Development Project (ICDP) or Community-Based Natural Re-
source Management (CBNRM) scheme (see Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). While this focuses the discussion
it ignores some of the more important instances in which more indirect approaches might achieve
environmental and poverty alleviation objectives. For instance, empirical evidence has shown that
PES interventions such as agri-environmental schemes like the Sloping Lands Conversion Programme
(SLCP) in China, have achieved both environmental and poverty alleviation objectives where they
were able to relax market and institutional constraints (Gauvin et al., 2009; Groom et al., 2009; Uchida
et al., 2009). Elsewhere it has been shown that relaxation of constraints to the o¤-farm labour market
can be pivotal in reducing deforestation and improving well-being in developing countries (Blu¤stone
1995; Pagiola and Shively, 2004). These are important examples since market and institutional con-
straints such as credit rationing, input quotas, insecure tenure, and so on, are the rule rather than
the exception in developing countries (e.g. Petrick 2005; Carter and Olinto 2003). In such cases,
indirect payments to relax market constraints can simultaneously achieve environmental objectives
and mobilise large transfers to recipients, over and above the donors payments. Indeed, Groom and
Palmer (2008) show precisely this possibility for indirectPES schemes. In such cases it is not a
question of either - or. Indirect PES can potentially achieve both.
The purpose of the paper is to better understand the context in which PES can achieve these
twin objectives simultaneously. In order to illustrate the importance of market constraints in policy
choice, we rst apply Groom and Palmers (2008) model of a donor seeking to inuence a recipient
who is subject to quantity constraints in an input market. The recipient is understood to be an
eco-entrepreneurof some description but could just as well be an agricultural producer. To make the
analysis more concrete, we then calibrate the model to the case of constrained forest honey production
in the Central Menabe region of Madagascar. As a non-timber forest product, honey production is a
popular sustainable livelihood strategy applied by donors to rural households in developing countries
(for a recent review, see Bradbear, 2009). This case also provides a direct comparison to the results of
Ferraro and Simpson (2002) who also used forest honey production in Madagascar to illustrate their
model of PES choice under perfect markets. We then analyse the e¢ ciency, cost-e¤ectiveness and
1Taken together, direct and indirect PES comprise the main policy alternatives to command-and-controlapproaches
(Ferraro and Kiss 2002).
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welfare impact of direct and indirect PES on forest honey producers, where indirect payments relax
an observed technological constraint and enables producers to switch from traditional to semi-modern
beehives (Dirac 2009).
The analysis provides some specic and general insights on the possibility of achieving both envi-
ronmental and poverty alleviation objectives. Firstly, in the case of honey production in Madagascar,
we nd that even where constraints are severe the donor prefers direct payments and the recipient
prefers constraints to be relaxed. This preference for direct payments accords with previous ndings
(Ferraro and Simpson 2002; 2005; Ferraro et al., 2005) and indicates that either environmental or
poverty alleviation objectives can be achieved cost-e¤ectively, but not both in this case. Secondly, we
show that despite being cost-e¤ective, the donors preferred direct PES is ine¢ cient because it ignores
the shadow value of relaxing the technology constraint.
More generally, whereas Ferraro and Simpsons (2002) nding is independent of the nature of
technology, sensitivity analysis shows that where market constraints prevail considerations such as
returns to scale and input complementarity are paramount. The case of honey production is shown
to be an unlikely scenario in which the twin environment and poverty alleviation objectives will be
achieved simultaneously via indirect payments. More likely scenarios might exist where production
exhibiting close to constant returns to scale are employed, such as commonly found in agriculture and
forestry for instance. This latter result perhaps explains the apparent success of the SLCP to achieve
both environmental and poverty objectives when it e¤ectively targeted constraints (e.g. Gauvin et
al., 2009).
We show how the results depend on what is known about the constraints faced by the PES recip-
ients and their substitution possibilities. All of which leads necessarily to a more detailed discussion
of how PES should be informed by the nature of market conditions, constraints and the production
process itself. Such information can assist in PES policy choice given donor objectives. For example,
a focus on achieving cost-e¤ectiveness might be critical in the design of new schemes for Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD). We also remark on the limitations of simple
axiomatic models to capture the complexities of PES policy design.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model, while Section 3 derives the
conditions for e¢ ciency, the donors preferences and the recipients preferences over direct and indirect
PES. Section 4 calibrates the model to the case of forest honey production in Madagascar and evaluates
the performance of direct and indirect PES schemes under various possible scenarios in Madagascar.
Section 5 discusses the results along with the limitations of the conceptual framework. Section 6
concludes.
2 A Model of PES with Constraints
2.1 The Model
Following Groom and Palmer (2008) we consider a PES implementing agency, an NGO or henceforth
donor, whose sole objective is to increase forest coverage at least cost to itself, and who is unconcerned
with the welfare of its recipients: it wants the biggest bang for the buck.2 On the other hand, we
have a prot-maximising eco-entrepreneur, henceforth recipient, who operates an ecologically benign
production process with two variable inputs to production, forest and capital.
Forest, F , represents any ecological attribute useful in the generation of an eco-friendly output.
Capital, K, represent some arbitrary input. Thus, a quantity, Q, of an eco-friendly product is pro-
duced using a production technology, f(K;F ). This technology represents an economic activity such
as eco-tourism or forest honey production that allows environmental services, for instance biodiversity,
to ow from the forest used in eco-production activities. The market prices of output, capital, and
2We ignore two important issues for simplicity: i) the objectives of the donor community and NGOs need not
coincide, and; ii) the distinction between households and local communities as recipients.
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forest, are PQ, PK , and PF , respectively, where PF is the opportunity cost of using forest in eco-
production, and may reect the return to agriculture. It is assumed that K is a technical complement
to forest in eco-production, i.e. @F@PK < 0.
3 We also assume that a unit of forest in eco-production
provides the same quantity and quality of environmental services as a unit of conserved forest. In the
absence of outside intervention, the recipient uses and thus conserves forest for eco-production. The
decision of the recipient, therefore, concerns the quantity of forest to allocate to eco-production given
that its cost as an input to production is PF .
The market constraint is captured parsimoniously by assuming that capital, K; is subject to non-
price rationing and limited to K. As well as reecting credit-rationing or input quotas, this constraint
could also approximate missing markets
 
K = 0

.4 By looking at the impact of relaxing a constraint,
this approach di¤ers from the market imperfections previously addressed in relation to PES.5
To the cost-e¤ectiveness of direct and indirect PES in this context we adapt the work of Fulginiti
and Perrin (1993) on constrained prot functions.6 Dene the constrained prot function as:
c
 
PQ; PF ; PK ; K; z

= max
F
PQf (F;K)  PFF   PK K (1)
This can be contrasted to the unconstrained prot function u (PQ; PF ; PK ; z), which describes the
solution to the unconstrained problem. It is straightforward to show that the constrained prot
function is related to the unconstrained prot function in the following way (see Appendix A for
details):
C
 
PQ; PF ; PK ; K; z

= U (PQ; PF ; Pv; z) + (Pv   PK) K (2)
where Pv is the virtualor shadow price of capital, that is, the price which would induce an unrestricted
recipient to choose the quantity K: Each value of K has a unique virtual price. Figure 1 shows this
relationship for an input constraint. Also shown in Figure 1 is the quantity
 
P 0v   PK

; which is often
called the quota rent. This is an important determinant of the results that follow.
2.2 The PES schemes
In terms of the potential PES strategies we assume that the donor has two options for inducing
greater conservation: 1) direct payments in the form of a subsidy to forest land (dPF ), or; 2) indirect
provision of forest land via relaxation of the constraint on capital, K (dK). The latter could involve
the provision of inputs or the relaxation of a quota on inputs or output. We compare the relative
cost-e¤ectiveness of policies in achieving a unit change on forest land assuming that no other side
payments are possible.
From Hotellings Rule applied to the constrained prot function, and the derivative of the con-
strained prot function with respect to F yields:  CF = F . Choosing dPF and dK so as to induce a
one unit change in forested land, F , gives the following relationship7 :
dF = 1 =  cFF dPF =
@FC
@PF
dPF =  cF KdK =
@FC
@ K
dK (3)
The impact of the indirect policy can be expressed as (see Appendix A):
3Without this assumption, a constraint on capital promotes forest cover compared to the unconstrained outcome.
4The model could represent an agricultural producer using land  and on-farm labour lo : Q = g (lo; ), in which
forest land, F , and o¤-farm labour, lw, are residuals to land and time constraints
 
L and 

: F =   ; lw = L  lo. In
this context the capital constraint K could be reframed as a constraint on o¤-farm labour: lw = C (e.g. see Angelsen,
1999). The analysis in this context is entirely analogous: relaxing C draws labour away from agriculture and reduces
land use, which increases land set aside. The direct payment could be a payment for set aside, or a tax on agricultural
land. At the margin these are identical, although their distributional e¤ects would di¤er.
5Muller and Albers (2004) model agricultural development programmes as increasing productivity of agricultural
production via a multiplicative parameter  : f (F;K). As we will see, there is a correspondence between this approach
and the calibration of the constraint in Section 4. Nevertheless, they ignore the value of relaxing the constraint.
6Parallel arguments apply to output constraints and can be easily accommodated.
7Note that: CFF =
@2C
@P2
F
and CK K =
@2C
@ K2
.
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1 =  cF KdK =
uFv
uvv
dK (4)
where the subscript v refers to the derivative with respect to the virtualprice of capital, Pv: The
construct of virtual prices generates a duality between constrained and unconstrained prot functions.
This is convenient since it allows the constrained analysis to be undertaken using the unconstrained
prot function. We now derive the conditions which determine the e¢ cient intervention and the
donors and recipients preferred intervention.
3 E¢ ciency, cost-e¤ectiveness and donor-recipient preferences
3.1 E¢ ciency
Which intervention generates the greatest improvement in welfare? This is what we mean by e¢ ciency,
and it di¤ers from the cost of conservation analysed by Ferraro and Simpson (2002; p 343). There the
starting point was a perfect market equilibrium and the comparison between the direct and indirect
payments compares the relative deadweight losses of each intervention. Here, the starting point is a
constrained equilibrium. Figure 1 illustrates that these deadweight losses, indicated by triangles a and
b, could be overwhelmed by an e¢ ciency gain measured by the quota rent, c. Therefore, the measure
of e¢ ciency weighs the quota rent against the relative deadweight losses. Formally, Appendix B shows
that where the unit resource cost of relaxing the constraint is the underlying market price PK , direct
payments for forest land are more cost-e¤ective if the following condition holds:
dC =
dK
2
 dP Iv   dPDv 
relative deadweight loss (b - a)
   P 0v   PK dK
released quota rent (c)
> 0 (5)
where dC is incremental cost of using indirect as opposed to direct payments.8 The term dP Iv is the
change in the virtual price as a consequence of relaxing the constraint on capital, K. The term dPDv
is the change in the virtual price of capital as a consequence of the direct subsidy to forest land.
Given the assumptions, the former is negative and the latter is positive. In e¤ect, this is the dual of
Ferraro and Simpsons (2002) result. The second term is the quota rent associated with relaxing the
constraint, and is positive. Hence, the sign of dC is indeterminate.
Figure 1 illustrates a comparison of direct and indirect payments where the market constraint is
binding. It is obvious that indirect payments are preferred to direct payments in this case since the
area the area c  b is larger than area a. That is, the additional prots arising from the released quota
rent are su¢ ciently large to overcome any relative deadweight loss. The opposite result could hold if
the constraint were less severe and/or the shadow price of capital low.
Ferraro and Simpson (2002) compared the deadweight loss associated with direct and indirect
payments when markets function perfectly. In the context of Figure 1 they compared areas a and b
and showed that the former is almost always smaller than the latter. Where markets are constrained
however, the quota rent, area c, must also be considered. From the perspective of the donor, the
quota rent represents a reduction in the funds required to achieve the targeted change in forest land
under indirect payments, compared to direct payments where no such rents are released. From the
perspective of the recipient, of course, the relaxation of constraints represents a transfer of resources.
This illustrates the importance of considering the prevailing market conditions prior to determining
the e¢ cient PES intervention.
Considering market constraints introduces one further possibility: the donor may prefer an inef-
cient intervention simply because it ignores the quota rent. We now turn to the preferences of the
donor and the recipient.
8Throughout the superscript 0 refers to the pre-intervention level of a variable and superscript 1 refers to the post-
intervention level. Similarly, I refers to indirect intervention and D refers to direct intervention.
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Figure 1: Direct v indirect payments for capital, K - a binding constraint
3.2 The Donors Preferred Policy
For small changes the donor must pay either  dPFF with direct payments, or PKdK under the
indirect policy of relaxing the constraints. A donor concerned solely with cost-e¤ectiveness will prefer
direct payments if:
 FdPF < PKdK (6)
Appendix C shows that this condition becomes:
uKF
cFF
< uKK +
1
K
@Ku
@Pv
 
P 0v   PK

(7)
where cij is the constrained elasticity of demand for input i with respect to price of input j, and
uij is the unconstrained equivalent.
9 The result reveals the dependence on specic features of the
technology: the virtual price elasticity of demand for capital, UKK , the quota rent associated with
the constraint
 
P 0v   PK

; the unconstrained cross elasticity of inputs, UKF ; and the constrained own
price elasticity of demand for forest land, CFF . In summary, condition (7) states that the donor will
almost always prefer direct to indirect approaches in a world of perfect markets where quota rents
are low. When binding market constraints exist, and the shadow value of the constraint is high, this
conclusion is no longer robust.
9Elasticities are dened as follows: ij =   @xi@pj
pj
xi
:
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3.3 The Recipients Preferred Policy
When the recipient is constrained in an input market, for small changes in PF or K, her prots will
change respectively as follows:10
dCF =
@C
@PF
dPF =  FdPF
dCK =
@C
@K
dK = P 0v dK
Hence she prefers direct payments if:
 FdPF > P 0v dK (8)
It is easy to see that when P 0v > PK , conditions (6) and (8) can hold simultaneously in favour of
indirect payments and both the donor and recipient will prefer this. The area of agreement is large
when the quota rent is large, that is, either when the input constraint is severe or when the shadow
value of the constraint is large. In this case it is possible that environmental and poverty alleviation
objectives need not be in conict since donor and recipient will agree on the appropriate PES scheme.
So, particularly where constraints are severe, indirect payments may not only provide cost-e¤ective
provision of forest land from the perspective of the donor, but may also provide the largest transfer
to PES recipients through released quota rent.
This gives rise to three important and related questions. Firstly, under what possible circumstances
will the cost-e¤ective PES scheme also achieve poverty alleviation goals? Secondly, will the donor
prefer the e¢ cient intervention? And thirdly, how important is it to understand market conditions
before designing a PES scheme? To answer these questions we apply the framework outlined in this
section to the case of forest honey production in Central Menabe, Madagascar.
4 Direct vs Indirect PES in Madagascar
4.1 Background
In this section, we illustrate the implications of constraints among potential recipients for PES policy
choice in Central Menabe, located on the west coast of Madagascar. Market constraints have long
been observed in Madagascar, particularly in agricultural and credit markets, which contribute to
poverty among rural households (see, for example, Barratt and Dorosh, 1996; Minten and Barratt,
2008).11 Our model is calibrated (see below) to the case of forest honey production using limited
primary data on local livelihoods, collected between 2005 and 2007 (Dirac, 2009). In particular we
utilise data on agricultural activities and non-timber forest products, including beekeeping.12
Potential PES recipients reside in poor, resource-dependent communities located at the edge of
a bio-diverse rich, dry forest. Preserving biodiversity in these areas, including a number of endemic
and currently endangered animal species, is one of the greatest ecological challenges that Madagascar
faces (Nicoll, 2003). Deforestation via slash-and-burn agriculture occurs at an annual rate of 1 percent
(Scales, 2007). A household in the study area cultivates an average of 1.86 hectares per year, typically
rice, maize, cassava and peanuts. Numerous NGOs, both local and international, and donors alike
10The term for dCK comes from Equation (17) in Appendix A, and assumes that the recipient receives the additional
inputs for free (does not pay PK). Of course there are distributional issues to be considered here. The division of
rents does not determine the e¢ cient outcome, but will a¤ect preferences for one or other PES scheme. We discuss the
possibility of such transfers below.
11 In 2005, 68.7 percent of Malagasies lived below the poverty line, a gure which rose to 73.5 percent in rural areas
(PNAE 2008).
12For example, during this time, 288 household questionnaires on local agricultural production were undertaken in
six villages, while another survey comprising a further 70 questionnaires were carried out in regional markets. Further
qualitative interviews were undertaken in four villages to obtain detailed information about beekeeping.
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operate in the area primarily (but not necessarily exclusively) for environmental reasons.13 Innovative
policy interventions to preserve biodiversity in the region already exist on the ground. For example, the
Durrell Wildlife Trust has been experimenting with an environmental auction among local communities
to participate in biodiversity monitoring. Conservation payments were paid out to the winnersof
the auction (see Durell, 2006). In our study area, NGOs have been considering various interventions
including direct payments, eco-tourism and the expansion of beekeeping.
Beekeeping and honey production is well-established in Central Menabe. Bees forage in diverse
natural and secondary forest formations in the vicinity of beehives. Households engaged in honey
production are observed to use two types of beehive, typically located in or around villages: traditional
and semi-modern.14 On average, a representative beekeeping household owns 1.84 beehives, of which
1.2 and 0.64 are classied as traditional and semi-modern respectively. Including labour costs to build
and maintain over the course of a year, traditional beehives cost US$ 8.10 per unit while semi-modern
hives cost US$ 25.82. Note, however, that semi-modern hives are not constructed locally. Instead, they
are donated by local NGOs. Hence, this price includes the market price paid by the NGO in addition
to the costs of training local households to use the hives e¤ectively. No market for semi-modern hives
exists in the study-area villages. A traditional beehive produces an average of 15 litres of honey per
year while the more productive semi-modern type produces 32 litres annually. Honey is typically sold
in the villages, either to locals or middlemen who then sell honey in more distant markets. During
the study period, honey prices remained stable at around US$ 2.87 per litre.
Forest honey production captures the relationships underlying the conceptual framework described
in sections 2 and 3. The production of honey requires forest as an input (see Sande et al., 2009). It also
requires labour and capital inputs more or less in xed proportions. In principle, therefore, a donor
wishing to conserve forests could subsidise forest land directly, or provide crucial capital inputs. Both
would simultaneously enhance honey production while employing more forest land in production.
As the theory shows, where households are subject to market constraints there are countervailing
arguments in favour of indirect actions to relax constraints. We now determine which intervention
is cost-e¤ective in the case of constrained honey production, and whether environmental and poverty
alleviation objectives can be achieved simultaneously.
4.2 Calibration of constrained honey production
4.2.1 The technology
Ferraro and Simpson (2002) went to great lengths to characterise the semi-modern technology of honey
production in Madagascar. Given our limited data, we return to their characterisation of the following
Cobb-Douglas production function: Q = AKF  , where Q is honey production, A is a productivity
parameter,  and  are the income shares of capital and forest respectively, and F and K are as
before. The technology has strong diminishing returns to scale in that  = 0:36 and  = 0:15, with
A = 48. Due to gaps in our own data, we use these parameter values for our study of Central Menabe.
It is worth considering the information embodied in these parameters. The parameters do not
explicitly reect the fact that forest land is often non-rival in honey production. Neither do they
reect the social and other relationships between households, forests and capital, such as property
rights and non-market values of land use and natural resources. In short, these parameters fail to
capture many of the nuances associated with the production process. However, in addition to strongly
diminishing returns to scale,  and  reect a low output elasticity of capital, K, and particularly
forest, F: This captures deterministically the low complementarity between F and K and the loose
13NGOs include the Durrell Wildlife Conservation Trust and Conservation International, while USAID have helped
nance the establishment and management of protected areas (Ferraro and Simpson, 2002; Dirac, 2009).
14 In traditional beekeeping, beehives are typically a single, big empty log found in the forest, closed in each side
with only very small apertures for the bees. For semi-modern beekeeping, farmers use semi-modern beehives, generally
Langstroth or Kenyan models. Semi-modern hives are more spacious than the traditional ones with honey produced on
cadresinside, which need to be periodically removed and the honey gathered. By contrast, honey is deposited inside
the traditional ones, which is then collected by household members (Dirac, personal communication).
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relationship between honey production and forests that might arise from non-rivalry, for instance.
These parameters are important determinants in choice of PES scheme, and in our discussion we
invoke this more general interpretation.
4.2.2 The constraint and behavioural assumptions
Ideally, the unconstrained and constrained demand functions can be derived in order to facilitate the
analysis via an empirical analysis along the lines of Fulginiti and Perrin (1993). However, the data from
Madagascar are only su¢ cient to calculate the descriptive statistics described above. In particular,
they contain no explicit denition of the constraints faced by honey producers. Nevertheless, the
presence of two types of beehive in the sample, semi-modern and traditional, allows us to identify and
characterise the production constraint when combined with assumptions concerning the production
technology. In particular, semi-modern beehives are signicantly more productive than traditional
ones, and are only used by recipients of assistance from NGOs working in the area.15 This provides
a prima facie case for the existence of a technological constraint underpinned by a capital constraint,
which is being relaxed by external donor intervention. In order to dene the constraint formally we
take the following approach.
Firstly, we dene the traditional technology as being a nested version of the semi-modern tech-
nology, di¤ering only in the e¤ective capital embodied in each beehive. That is, we can dene the
following general technology in terms of e¤ective capital EK:
Q = A (EK)

F 
where E = 1 for the traditional technology, and E > 1 for the semi-modern technology. K still
represents the number of beehives and E represents the di¤erences in the construction of traditional
and semi-modern such as the surface area available inside the hive. EK can thus be understood as the
surface area for honey production, for instance.16 The characterisation of the technology in this way
allows us to represent the traditional technology as a capital-constrained version of the semi-modern
technology. As noted already a substantial outlay is required in order to obtain the new technology.
In the absence of access to own funds, collateral and/or credit markets this investment will fail to
materialise. The analysis of the relaxation of this constraint is one way in which to operationalise the
theory presented above. This requires calibration of the value of E and K.
To do this we now assume that both traditional and semi-modern producers are prot maximis-
ers conditional on their own technology and the associated prices. This denes supply functions:
QT
 
PTK ; PF ;E
T = 1

and QT
 
PTK ; PF ;E
SM

, for each technology. These di¤er only because of the
di¤erent values of the parameter E and the price of traditional and semi-modern beehives: PTK and
PSMK , respectively. To dene the parameter E for semi-modern producers we use the observation that
the prot-maximising output of traditional production is approximately half that of unconstrained
semi-modern production despite the higher price of semi-modern beehives: QSM = 2QT (Dirac, 2009).
This leads to the following denition of ESM :
QSM
 
PSMK ; PF ;E
SM

= 2QT
 
PTK ; PF ;E
T = 1

(9)
With ESM dened, it is then possible to dene the e¤ective capital constraint, K, faced by traditional
producers in terms of the semi-modern technology by dening K as follows17 :
15Since the semi-modern hive is more complicated to use than the traditional ones, farmers have to be trained by
NGOs on how to use and manage the modern beehives. Once the farmers have learned how to manage them, the amount
of work needed to operate the modern hives is approximately the same as that required for operating the traditional
ones.
16Bradbear (2009) describes this as one major distinction between the traditional and semi-traditional technologies,
alongside the need for training to use the latter, etc.
17Note that (9) and (10) are not identities and allow the calibration of ESM at the intersection of these respective
supply curves.
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QSM
 
PSMK ; PF ;E
SM

= 2QSM
 
PSMK ; PF ;E
SM ; K

(10)
The implication of (9) and (10) is that QSM
 
PSMK ; PF ;E
SM ; K

= QT
 
PTK ; PF ;E
T = 1

. This is
the sense in which the unconstrained traditional producers are assumed to be analogous to constrained
semi-modern producers.
Our method of characterising the capital constraint obviously relies heavily on the technological and
behavioural assumptions. The implications are as follows. Firstly, the traditional and the constrained
semi-modern have constrained supply curves (Q) and constrained demand curves for forest, FC (:) ;
that are identical in PF  space. However, the demand for e¤ective capital di¤ers between these two
technologies, with the latent demand for e¤ective capital much higher for semi-modern capital due
to its higher productivity. The analysis of the relaxation of the capital constraint assumes that the
honey producer is assisted in shifting from one technology to another as additional semi-modern hives
are provided as part of the indirect PES scheme. The impact of indirect payments is analysed along
the semi-modern demand curve rather than the traditional.18
This gives rise to another wrinkle for the analysis. There are two possible constrained scenarios
when considering direct payments. Firstly, a partially constrained analysis in which direct payments
induce additional traditional hives to be employed, KT . Secondly, there is a totally constrained
scenario in which capital remains constrained at K. We compare both scenarios to indirect relaxation
of the constraint, K, with semi-modern capital.
4.3 Direct vs indirect payments: What do stakeholders prefer?19
4.3.1 Dening the constraint: The constrained and unconstrained solutions
We use the following parameter values and approximations from the data for the simulation: [;
; A; PSMK ; P
T
K ; PQ; Q
SM=QT ] = [0:36; 0:15; 48; 24; 8; 3; 2]. Table 1 shows the solutions to the
traditional technology, the semi-modern and the constrained semi-modern that the method described
above yields.
Technology E K F Q 
Traditional 1 18.5 0.88 134.5 201.0
Semi-Modern (Constrained) 7.7 2.4 0.88 134.5 201.0
Semi-Modern (Unconstrained) 7.7 12.3 1.76 269.0 402.0
Table 1: Characterisation of Technology Constraint
Solving for ESM using (9) leads to ESM = 7:7: The semi-modern technology, with its greater
e¤ective capital, produces greater quantities and prots while using more forest with fewer beehives.
Using (10) to solve for the capital constraint yields: K = 2:4. This reects the e¤ective capital
constraint faced by households using traditional technology in terms of the semi-modern technology.
This is reected in the semi-modern constrained scenario in row three of Table 1.20
The simulation has two parts. Firstly, we employ the theory to estimate the subsidy to forest,
dPF , and the amount of capital, dK, required to increase forest land. We follow Ferraro and Simpson
(2002) in this regard to analyse the direct or indirect payments required to e¤ect a 0.1 hectare change
in forest land for a single recipient, assuming that ten such households are subject to the intervention.
18This requires a correction to the prots associated with the constrained semi-modern technology in Table (1) from
291.2 to 200.1 in order to make the two coincide in all aspects. Complete details of the analysis can be obtained from
the authors on request.
19The analytical solutions are available from the authors on request.
20 In e¤ect, by determining EM = 7:7 we have determined that K = KT =7:7 = 2:4: We could have determined the
constraint on the basis of equal prots between traditional and constrained semi-modern. Not only is this not what
we observe, but this makes the constraint even more severe and hence, tips the balance even more in favour of indirect
payments.
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We analyse direct payments for the two possible constrained scenarios described above: partial and
total. This allows us to assess the e¢ ciency, cost-e¤ectiveness and preferences of the donor and the
recipient over these distinct PES schemes with varying market conditions.
Secondly, we undertake a comparison of these results where it is assumed that the recipient is an
unconstrained producer who responds to subsidies to either forest or capital: dPF and dPK . That is,
if market conditions are ignored.
4.3.2 What the donor prefers
Table 2 shows that in both the partially- and totally-constrained cases the donor prefers direct pay-
ments over indirect payments to release capital constraints. In the totally constrained case a direct
payment of US$ 6:17 is required to induce an increase of 0.1 hectares. Since the donor must subsidise
all units of forest employed, not just the marginal units, the total cost per recipient is:  FdPF = 6:05:
The total cost over the 10 households is US$ 60:5.21 In the partially-constrained case households are
more responsive and the cost to the donor is reduced to US$ 54:3. This shows the obvious implication
that direct payments become less cost-e¤ective the more constrained the recipients are.
Constrained Analysis (total, K; and partial, KT ; constraints)
Cost to Donor Impact on Recipient
Payment Scheme 1 ha Per hshld dK or dPF dQ d QR dQR DWL
Direct Payments
 
KT

54.3 5.43 5.54 3.4 5.1 NA NA 0.31
Direct Payments
 
K

60.5 6.05 6.17 2.2 5.7 38.7 0 0.35
Indirect Payments 168.0 16.80 0.71 15. 4 40.0 29.2 26.4 3.21
Unconstrained Analysis (following Ferraro and Simpson, 2002)
Payment Scheme 1 ha Per hshld dPF or dPK dQ d QR dQR DWL
Direct Payments 53.9 5.39 2.91 3.5 5.2 NA NA 1.48
Indirect Payments 244.1 24.4 1.74 15.3 22.9 NA NA 1.55
Table 2: Direct vs Indirect Payments, Constrained vs Unconstrained (US$)
Table 2 shows the outcome of indirect payments to relax constraints.22 Although 0:7 additional
units of capital (approximately 1.5 beehives) are required to induce the required increase in forest
land, the cost of this to the donor across ten households is $168 where PSMK = 24. On the basis of the
narrow objective of cost-e¤ectiveness, it is clear that the donor would prefer direct payments. This
would save in the region of US$108 per hectare of forest conserved, with a greater saving if households
can introduce more traditional beehives in response. Indeed, purchasing the land outright is more
cost-e¤ective than indirect payments.
4.3.3 What the recipient prefers
Of course, that is just one side of the story. The preferences of the recipient are determined by
the inequality shown in (8). Table 2 shows that the recipient clearly prefers the indirect approach to
direct payments in both partially- and totally-constrained scenarios. The increase in prots from direct
payments is only US$ 5.1 or US$ 5.7 with direct payments in the partially- and totally-constrained
scenarios, respectively. While direct payments are increasingly desirable to the recipient when it is
more constrained, the impact on prot should be compared to a change of over US$ 40 when constraints
are relaxed. A signicant portion of the latter is the released quota rent
  
P 0v   PSMK

dK

, which is
21 F:dPF =  0:98   6:17 = 6:05, where 6.17 is the payment per hectare for a household.
22For the constrained case column 3 measures  FdPF for direct payments and  PSMK dK for the indirect relaxation
of capital constraint. For the unconstrained case, column 3 shows  FdPF for direct payments, or  KdPSMK for indirect
payments: a price subsidy.
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indicated by dQR in Table 2 and estimated to be approximately US$ 26:4. This corresponds to area
c in Figure 1.23
In summary, when considering market conditions for the case of Malagasy honey producers, the
preferences of the donor and the recipient remain in tension regardless of whether the recipient can
adjust traditional capital or not. This nding accords with Ferraro and Simpson (2002) who ignored
market conditions. Hence, even where honey producers are technologically constrained, environmental
and poverty alleviation objectives remain in tension from the perspective of the donor: the cost-
e¤ective strategy does not induce the greatest transfer to the recipient.
4.3.4 What is e¢ cient?
Ferraro and Simpson (2002) discuss cost-e¤ectiveness in terms of the relative deadweight losses as-
sociated with direct and indirect payments. Where market constraints exist, however, the value of
relaxing the constraint must also be considered. The presence of a market constraint means that a
distinction is drawn between the broader concept of e¢ ciency and the more narrowly-dened objec-
tives of the donor. Under the assumption of perfect markets, what is e¢ cient need not coincide with
what the donor might consider to be cost-e¤ective.
The e¢ cient intervention is determined by condition (5). As predicted by Ferraro and Simpson
(2002), the deadweight loss under indirect payments is larger at US$ 3:2; than for direct payments in
the totally-constrained case, which are US$ 0:35 (areas b and a, respectively, in Figure (1)). However,
there is a large e¢ ciency gain as a consequence of relaxing the capital constraint, which is measured
by the released quota rent of US$ 26:4, as shown in Table 2. The incremental cost of employing
direct rather than indirect payments in this case is therefore US$ 23:6: This represents an important
e¢ ciency gain, much of which is the released quota rent that is transferred to the recipient. While
the incremental cost declines when partial constraints are considered, the story remains the same.
In e¤ect, the donors contributions release extra resources which contribute both to the environ-
mental objective and the welfare of the recipient and hence, may well have an impact on poverty.
But if the donor is concerned only with the much narrower objective of cost-e¤ectiveness, then it will
prefer direct payments.
4.3.5 What if we ignore market conditions?
The lower part of Table 2 shows the outcome of the analysis if we assume that the recipients in
Madagascar are unconstrained prot maximisers. The starting point for this aspect of the simulation
is an unconstrained semi-modern honey producer. We then analyse the response to direct payments
to forest land and indirect payments to capital in the form of subsidies, rather than relaxing capital
constraints. As well as placing donor and recipient in tension, ignoring market conditions makes direct
payments look more cost-e¤ective than they really are. This can be seen in the underestimation of
the costs to the donor of US$ 53.9 rather than US$ 60.5 per ha of conserved forest in the case of a
totally-constrained household. On the other hand, the benets to the recipients are underestimated:
$US 5.2 instead of US$ 5.7. These and other errors arise due to the incorrect assessment of the
responsiveness to prices from using unconstrained rather than constrained demand functions. This
illustrates the importance of understanding the market conditions and substitution possibilities faced
by recipients in assessing PES.
23Lastly, note that the initial quota rent
 
P 0v   PSMK

is US$ 37:7. Under direct payments this increases to US$ 38:7
as the virtual price increases. Under indirect payments the constraint is relaxed and the quota rent declines to US$
29:2.
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5 Environment and poverty alleviation: Either, or, or both?
5.1 Sensitivity analysis
In the case of Madagascar, the technological and other considerations are such that the donor will
prefer direct payments for forest conservation, even when market conditions are considered. The
recipient, on the other hand, will prefer indirect relaxation of capital constraints. This nding accords
with Ferraro and Simpson (2002). However, the results di¤er in that the e¢ cient course of action
is to employ indirect payments in honey production. In the case of honey production, it seems that
there will always be a tension here between the role that PES can play in obtaining environmental
objectives and its role in improving well-being and reducing poverty.
Nevertheless, the theory illustrates the possibility that dual objectives need not be in tension at
all (see (8) and (6)). The results are clearly going to be sensitive to the assumptions concerning
the technological parameters, as well as the relative prices of inputs and outputs. In this section we
undertake a sensitivity analysis of the simulation in order to identify the conditions under which the
preferences of the donor and recipient may or may not be in tension. This enables us to identify when
environmental and poverty alleviation objectives may be achieved simultaneously. This leads to a
discussion of the extent to which the axiomatic approach taken here is useful in analysing PES design
before discussing some broader issues associated with the choice of policy.
Since it is obvious how variation in the price variables will a¤ect the result, the interesting para-
meters are those describing the technology. In the Cobb-Douglas case, the conditions for donor and
recipient to prefer indirect payments (conditions (6) and (8) respectively) become:24
 <
PK
P 0v
; and 1 <
1

(11)
This indicates that the recipient will prefer indirect payments for any value of  which is less than one.
Yet as argued by Ferraro and Simpson (2002), this is highly likely in the case of honey production. It
is also very likely in general, so we take it as given that the recipient always prefers indirect payments.
Taking K as given, the quantity    PK=P 0v is plotted in Figure 2 for varying values of  and .25
In order to compare these combinations to a constant-returns-to-scale technology, combinations of 
and  such that +  = 1 are also plotted.
Figure 2 shows that for a given constraint and for a given value of , higher values of  will tend
to induce the donor to prefer indirect payments. Similarly, for a given value of , larger values of 
will induce preferences for indirect payments. Thus, the complementarity of inputs is an important
determinant of PES preferences. In particular, note that the elasticity of F with respect to K along
the constrained demand curve is given by 1  , which is increasing in  and : The higher the
responsiveness of forest to changes in the capital constraint, the more likely it is that indirect payments
will be preferred by the donor.
Returns to scale are also important in determining the donors preferred PES scheme. For extreme
values of one or other parameter, the donor will prefer indirect payments only for technologies which
are close to constant returns to scale. For intermediate values of each parameter, i.e. where both are
close to 0.5, a range of decreasing-returns-to-scale technologies can support indirect payments to relax
constraints. The case in hand, honey production, is also indicated in Figure 2. Here the production
elasticity of forest, , is extremely small, returns to scale are strongly decreasing and direct payments
are clearly preferred. Of course, this conclusion is dependent on the price of relaxing the constraint,
PK . Figure 3 in Appendix D shows that if PK = 1 then indirect payments to relax constraints would
be preferred.
24This is true in the Cobb-Douglas case, since  = Pv K=PQQ and  = PFF=PQQ.
25Pv is given by Pv = PQAE K 1F . Hence, from (11) the quantity    PK
 
PQAE
 K 1F
 1 is plotted
in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Donor Preferences over Direct and Indirect Payments: Variation with Technological Para-
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5.2 Discussion
In sum, the analysis illustrates the importance of understanding market and institutional constraints
when designing PES policy interventions. PES schemes which endeavour to relax binding constraints
can in principle achieve environmental and poverty alleviation objectives simultaneously. In addi-
tion, where households are market constrained the cost-e¤ectiveness of PES depends crucially on the
specics of production. This enables the identication of the type of production process that is a likely
candidate for indirect interventions. Taking the simple Cobb-Douglas model literally, where produc-
tion exhibits constant returns to scale or has highly complementary inputs the simulation shows a
greater likelihood that the donor will prefer indirect payments which relax constraints. In practice
this might occur where the production process is more closely linked to land-use changes, or where
production has been shown to be more or less constant returns to scale, such as in agriculture or in
forestry (see e.g. Battese and Coelli 1992). In such cases indirect PES for agri-environmental schemes
where households face constraints in input or output markets, e.g. in o¤-farm labour, could be en-
visaged. Provided constraints can be identied, targeted and e¤ectively relaxed, indirect PES may
achieve both poverty reduction and environmental improvements, not either or. Indeed, it appears
that this is precisely what happened in the Sloping Lands Conversion Programme in China in which
the relaxation of liquidity and o¤-farm labour market constraints has succeeded in both reducing
poverty and providing environmental benets (Gauvin et al., 2009; Groom et al., 2009; Uchida et al.,
2009).
Nevertheless, the analysis indicates that indirect approaches are unlikely to be cost-e¤ective for
the donor in the case of forest honey production. In terms of the parameters of the model, stark
decreasing returns to scale and weak relationships between capital and forest inputs tend to favour
direct PES, despite a severe constraint. Indeed, this nding is made stronger when one considers
what is left out of the production function analysis. For instance, to the extent that it is not reected
in the parameter , the public good nature of forests makes the link between capital and forest
even weaker. Ferraro and Simpson (2002) provide a number of convincing additional arguments in
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favour of direct payments, over and above cost-e¤ectiveness. From this perspective, the prospect of
attaining environmental and poverty alleviation objectives simultaneously seems particularly remote.
As a policy intervention, overcoming technological constraints in honey production should probably be
considered a more cost-e¤ective poverty alleviation strategy than a means of securing environmental
improvements.
However, even in the case of forest honey production, indirect PES is e¢ cient in the sense that
it generates the lowest deadweight welfare loss. In fact, due to the released quota rent it generates a
welfare gain. This means that indirect payments would almost certainly be preferred if side payments
were possible. Conceptually, one simple way in which to make this transfer would be for the donor to
ask for a contribution towards the costs of relaxing the constraint, so that the donor in e¤ect provides
matching funds. In the context of the model, this would be reected in a reduction in the price
paid by the donor, PK , which is transferred to the recipient. Where indirect payments are e¢ cient
it would always be possible to achieve a Pareto improvement and hence, achieve both environmental
and poverty alleviation objectives.26
Of course, such a strategy ignores the attendant problems associated with organising and bargain-
ing over side payments, as well as other costs associated with each type of payments scheme. Indeed,
the axiomatic approach taken here also ignores many other features of the problem. For instance,
the assumption of prot maximisation underpins latent demand and the notion of a quota rent. If
recipients were satiscing, as considered by Angelson (1999) in relation to deforestation, then the in-
direct approach would be much less e¤ective in increasing forest land and improving well-being. Also
absent from this approach is any clear understanding of the social relationships that are likely to exist
between household labour, forests, and capital. For example, in the Madagascar case we note that
there is some evidence of local resistance to the use of cash payments in direct PES schemes (see, for
example, Pollini 2008; Hockley and Andriamarovololona 2007). One important reason is that some
people simply prefer in-kind transfers instead of cash. Other, more straightforward economic reasons
include a lack of local markets for products such as for some agricultural inputs and a lack of banking
facilities, which may give disincentives for saving. Whether direct or indirect, in-kind payments will
be highly e¤ective if they also manage to relax and important constraint. Overall, production analysis
considered on its own only sheds limited light on PES policy choice.
In equal measure, although we have o¤ered a means of identifying the constraint, it is rather crude
in that it sidesteps the underlying reasons for its existence. In general these undoubtedly include
informational issues, institutional dimensions such as land rights and labour market rigidities, and
other social concepts such as norms (e.g. Carter and Olinto 2003, Grosjean et al, 2008). We have
casually motivated failings in the capital market as underpinning the technological constraint. This is
usually framed as an informational problem in which case it may not be realistic to assume that the
donor would have better information about the recipient than the institutions which ration credit, and
hence would be no better placed to relax this constraint (Ghosh et al., 2000). More generally, there
will always be some informational asymmetry between the donor and recipient, which will muddy the
waters of PES design and is not considered explicitly here.27
Lastly, while a latent demand for joint products from interventions such as eco-tourism and forest
honey might already exist, weak property rights and hence lack of markets for so-called environmental
services implies the need for market creation. This is one reason for potentially high transaction
costs in the creation of demand for environmental services, which, for example, still plague the fast-
developing carbon market including schemes that provide direct payments for carbon sequestration in
biomass (see van Kooten et al., 2002; Palmer and Silber, 2009). Knowing transaction costs is crucial
for comparing relative cost-e¤ectiveness and e¢ ciency in interventions. It could be argued that since
indirect payments address an existing, albeit constrained, institutional environment, they circumvent
some specic di¢ culties associated with market creation.
26 In the general PES literature, note that so-called indirectPES are typically not even classied as such (for example,
see Engel et al. 2008). Instead, interventions such as eco-tourism and honey production are rather seen as market-based
instruments, although to some extent this is a discussion about semantics.
27See Feng (2007) for a contracting model of PES with dual policy goals in a world of asymmetric information.
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Without detailed data on the economic, institutional and social environment facing the households
under analysis, it becomes di¢ cult to undertake anything but an approximate quantitative analysis.
Exploiting the assumptions concerning the production process and household behaviour, and the
limited data on prices and quantities, is an attempt to bridge this informational gap. The approach
taken here can, at best, be described as a parsimonious representation of the constraints faced in
honey production in Madagascar, which avoids any analysis of wider economic, social and institutional
issues. While the results point to the importance of technology and market constraints in achieving
both poverty alleviation and environmental goals, the design of PES schemes should be informed by
a deeper political economy analysis.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the market conditions in developing countries under which PES interven-
tions, direct and indirect, to induce conservation may also lead to poverty alleviation. Identifying the
market conditions may be an important factor in choice of policy instrument and hence in potential
outcomes from intervention. Data collected in the Central Menabe region of Madagascar are used to
illustrate the response of technology-constrained households to direct and indirect PES. Specically,
we calibrate a model of forest honey production in which two di¤erent technologies of production are
employed by households, traditional and semi-modern. Within this limited framework, we compared
the cost-e¤ectiveness, e¢ ciency and donor-recipient preferences for direct and indirect PES interven-
tions. Indirect payments involved the relaxation of a technology constraint, which, in the stylised
context of the model, is simply a question of supplying modern beehives.
Our results show that where households are technology constrained, the donor and recipient do
not agree on cost-e¤ective payments which relax constraints. The technological constraint faced by
honey producers is not su¢ ciently severe to favour relaxing the capital constraint, although they
would prefer indirect payments due to the presence of quota rents. As we show the donors preference
for direct payments is primarily due to the the severe decreasing returns to scale that are observed
in beekeeping. We also note that the donors preference is not socially e¢ cient, meaning that if side
payments such as matching funding were feasible, the donor could be persuaded to employ indirect
payments. More generally, the results are sensitive not only on the severity of the constraint and the
costs of relaxing it, but also the extent of diminishing returns and complementarity of inputs. We note
that detailed institutional and other context-specic information is required to better understand and
challenge the behavioural assumptions underlying our results.
Irrespective of the model approach, it is clear that some production processes are more closely
connected to the provision of environmental services than others. Our limited modelling exercise
provides some guidance in that regard. This is important given the ongoing and rapid take-up and
expansion of PES all over the world. Cost-e¤ective interventions will, for example, be key in the
implementation of schemes for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) (see
Stern, 2006; Eliasch, 2008; Palmer and Engel, 2009). How REDD might be implemented on the ground
is still a focus of much debate but in principle carbon services could be supplied either directly or
indirectly. Furthermore, our discussion of dual policy goals suggests a need for targeting not only with
respect to choice of technology but also with respect to space. While macro-level studies suggest a
direct correlation between poverty and environment (e.g. Sachs et al., 2009), the empirical evidence at
the micro-level suggests that PES is not necessarily beneting the poor for various reasons including the
presence of institutional and other types of constraints (see Engel et al., 2008). Inversely, targetting
of the poor may well have reduced the environmental benets associated with the SLCP in China
(Uchida et al., 2009). Nevertheless, where constrained recipients and environmental assets coincide,
indirect approaches could well represent both a cost-e¤ective and welfare-enhancing alternative to the
highly - feted direct payment approach.
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Appendices
A Constrained and Unconstrained Prot Function
We follow Fulginiti and Perrin (1993) in showing that the constrained and unconstrained prot func-
tions are related in the single input case. The unconstrained prot function is:
U (PQ; PF ; PK ; z) = max
K;F
PQf (F;K)  PFF   PKK (12)
F and K are freely chosen subject to the xed inputs, z. If K is constrained
 
K = K

, the constrained
prot function can be written in terms of the partial prot function as P (:):
C
 
PQ; PF ; PK ; K; z

= max
F
PQf
 
F; K
  PFF   PK K
= P
 
PQ; PF ; K; z
  PK K (13)
The virtual or shadow price of capital, Pv, is dened as the price that would induce the rm to choose
K, and is a function of the other variables: Pv = Pv
 
PQ; PF ; K; z

. U (:) can then be written as:
U (PQ; PF ; Pv; z) = max
K;F
PQf (F;K)  PFF   PKK
= P
 
PQ; PF ; K; z
  Pv K (14)
which gives a formal denition of Pv : uv =   K28 . At Pv, U and C are then related as follows:
U (PQ; PF ; Pv; z) = 
C
 
PQ; PF ; Pv; K; z

and from (13) and (14) we get:
C
 
PQ; PF ; PK ; K; z

= U (PQ; PF ; Pv; z) + (Pv   PK) K (15)
It is straightforward to show the following relationships which are used in the text:
cF = 
u
F +
 
uv   K
 @Pv
@PF
= uF (16)
cK = (Pv   PK) +
 
uv   K
 @Pv
@ K
= (Pv   PK) (17)
The Hessian of the constrained prot function in terms of the unconstrained for inputs F and K are:
cK K =   (uvv) 1 (18)
cF K =  uFv (uvv) 1 (19)
cFF = 
u
FF +
u
Fv (
u
vv)
 1
uvF (20)
Similar results would pertain in relation to an output constraint.
28Where uc =
@u
@PV
:
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B E¢ ciency of Direct and Indirect Payments: Equation (5)
A second-order approximation for the change in prots when additional forest is provided by direct
means is given by (dropping z for brevity):
C
 
PQ; PF + dPF ; PK ; K

t C
 
PQ; PF ; PK ; K

+CF dPF +
1
2
CFF (dPF )
2
The total cost is calculated by subtracting from this expression the overall cost of the direct payments
intervention to the donor. The total cost is given by the right-hand side of the following expression,
where F0 is the initial level of forest cover. The right-hand side is the deadweight loss:29
C
 
PQ; PF + dPF ; PK ; K
 C  PQ; PF ; PK ; K+ F0 + @F
@PF
dPF

dPF
t
1
2
@F
@PF
(dPF )
2 (21)
The same procedure for indirect payments to relax capital constraints yields:
C
 
PQ; PF ; PK ; K + d K

t C
 
PQ; PF ; PK ; K

+CKd
K +
1
2
CK K (dK)
2
t C
 
PQ; PF ; PK ; K

+
 
P 0v   PK

dK +
1
2
CK K (dK)
2
Subtracting the resource cost PKdK; yields the net prots:30
C
 
PQ; PF ; PK ; K + dK
 C  PQ; PF ; PK ; K  PKdK
t
1
2
@Pv
@ K
(dK)
2
+
 
P 0v   PK

dK (22)
where P 0v is the initial virtual price of capital at K = K. The right-hand side of (21) is area a in
Figure 1. The right-hand side of (22) is area b and c in Figure 1. Expression (5) is obtained by taking
the right-hand side of (22) from the right-hand side of (21):
1
2

@F
@PF
(dPF )
2   @Pv
@K
(dK)
2

   P 0v   PK dK (23)
Note that the change in the virtual price of capital as a result of the indirect payments, dP Iv , is given
by dP Iv =
@Pv
@K dK and the change in the virtual price as a result of the direct payments is given by
dPDv =  dPFdK .31 . Via substitution of (23):
1
2
 dPDv dK   dP Iv dK   P 0v   PK dK
which is one step from (5).
29This is equivalent to expression A4 in Ferraro and Simpson (2002), corrected only by the absence of the minus sign
on the right-hand side.
30Note that CK = (Pv   PK) and CK K =
@Pv
@ K
in the case of a constrained input (Fulginiti and Perrin, 1993).
31The laborious algebra is as follows: dPDv =
@Pv
@PF
dPF , which noting equation (17) and using symmetry can be
written as dPDv = 
C
F K
dPF =  
U
Fv
Uvv
dPF . Given (4) this can be written as dPDv =   dPFdK . Details can be found in
Fulginiti and Perrin (1993, p99).
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C The NGOs Preferences: Equation (7)
The NGO prefers direct payments if  dPFF < PKdK. Noting from (3) and (4) that dPF =   1CFF
and dK = 
U
vv
UFv
; this becomes:
F
CFF
=
 F
@FC=@PF
< PK
Uvv
UFv
= PK
 @KU=@Pv
 @FU=@Pv
Taking the reciprocal and multiplying both sides by PF gives:
 @F
C
@PF
PF
F
>
 @FU=@Pv
 @KU=@Pv
PF
PK
Given symmetry of the unconstrained prot function we have: @FU=@Pv = @KU=@PF . Inserting this,
multiplying top and bottom by K and rearranging yields (7):32
UKF
CFF
< UKK +
1
K
@KU
@Pv
 
P 0v   PK

D Sensitivity of Donor Preferences to the price of capital, PK
32Note that the numerator of the RHS of (7) is equal to   @KU
@Pv
PK
K
, which would be the point elasticity at Pv but for
the fact that it is evaluated at PK : Noting that PK = (Pv + PK   Pv) the numerator becomes:
UKK +
1
K
@KU
@Pv
(Pv   PK)
From this point it is easy to get (7).
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Figure 3: Donors Preferences over Indirect and Direct Payments: Technology ( and ) and the Price
of Capital (PK).
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